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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Williamson v. Gregoire
Elbert Williamson was convicted of first degree child molestation
in Spokane County Superior Court in 1990.1 He was sentenced to
twenty-seven months of confinement and one year of community
placement. In August 1994 Mr. Williamson was discharged after
serving the required term of community placement.2 However, this
apparent resolution did not end Mr. Williamson's tribulations.
Unlike many other convicted criminals, Mr. Williamson's punish-
ment continued even after the completion of his sentence, when he
became subject to the registration and notification provisions of
Washington's sex offender laws.'
The sex offender laws in Washington resemble laws recently
enacted in many other states. Collectively they are known as
"Megan's Laws," and they represent an unparalleled legislative
* J.D. Candidate 2000, Seattle University School of Law; B.A. 1994, University of Puget
Sound. Special thanks to my parents for their support and inspiration, and to my friend and
colleague, Brendyn Ryan, for his invaluable input.
1. Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1181 (9thCir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 824
(1999).
2. Id. See also Brief of Respondent-Appellee, Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180 (9th
Cir. 1998) (No. 97-35699).
3. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1181. See also WASH. REV. CODE 9A.44.130 (1998); WASH.
REV. CODE 4.24.550 (1998).
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response to an emotionally charged issue: high rates of recidivism
among convicted sex offenders.
In Washington, as in other jurisdictions, the legislature has
responded to the fears of its electorate over the high recidivism rate of
convicted sex offenders by enacting laws that require convicted sex
offenders to register with local authorities, thereby making their pres-
ence in the community known.' Under the Washington sex offender
statute, local law enforcement officials must forward the registration
information to the state's central registry of sex offenders.5 Addition-
ally, if the state's central registry determines that an offender presents
a risk to the residents of a community, the law authorizes public agen-
cies to release information to the public about the registered offender.6
While the nature and extent of public disclosure vary based on the
offender's risk of reoffense, community notification generally includes,
at a minimum, the offender's name, address, and crime for which he
or she was convicted.7
In August 1995, one year after completing his sentence and
becoming subject to the registration and notification provisions of
Washington's sex offender laws, Mr. Williamson filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Washington, in which he challenged the validity of his convic-
tion.8 According to the federal statute pertaining to habeas corpus, the
District Court was required to find that Mr. Williamson was "in cus-
tody" before it could assert subject matter jurisdiction.9
The District Court held that the state registration requirement
effectively placed Mr. Williamson "in custody" for purposes of federal
habeas corpus relief, but found that he had not properly raised his
constitutional claims in the state courts." Consequently, the court
denied the writ on grounds of procedural default. Mr. Williamson
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit."
In a case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit held that the reg-
istration provisions of Washington's sex offender registration law did
not place Mr. Williamson "in custody" for purposes of federal habeas
corpus, and, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear
4. WASH. REV. CODE 9A.44.130 (1998).
5. WASH. REV. CODE 43.43.540 (1998).
6. Id.
7. WASH. REV. CODE 4.24.550 (1998).
8. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1182.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994).
10. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1182.
11. Id.
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Mr. Williamson's petition. 12 In its opinion, the court reviewed the
long line of precedent interpreting the "in custody" provision, and
determined that the registration and notification provisions of Wash-
ington's law were more accurately described as a collateral conse-
quence of his crime rather than a restraint on his liberty. 3 Absent
such a restraint on Mr. Williamson's liberty, the court held, he could
not be considered "in custody." Accordingly, Mr. Williamson's peti-
tion was denied. 4
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit was wrong. The regis-
tration and notification provisions operate to constructively restrain
the liberty of a convicted sex offender and, therefore, Mr. Williamson
is "in custody" for purposes of habeas corpus relief. To support this
proposition, this Note will first discuss the federal statute pertaining to
habeas corpus and review the case law interpreting the jurisdictional
requirement that the petitioner be "in custody"; second, review and
discuss Washington State's sex offender registration and notification
statutes; and finally, analyze the relevant statute and analogous case
law in the context of Washington's sex offender laws in order to dem-
onstrate that Mr. Williamson is "in custody" and is, therefore, entitled
to file a petition for habeas corpus relief.
II. THE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS STATUTE -
28 U.S.C. § 2241
The writ of habeas corpusS is a procedural device whereby an
individual may seek judicial review of the validity of executive, judi-
cial, or private restraints on personal liberty. 6 The writ is not meant
to affect the ultimate determination of a person's guilt or innocence.
Rather, it is a civil postconviction remedy that allows a federal court to
collaterally review the legality of the restraint imposed on a person
who has been lawfully convicted.' 7 If an individual challenges his or
her restraint and the court finds the restraint to be illegal, the court
may order the immediate release of the challenger.'
12. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184-85.
13. ld. at 1183.
14. Id. at 1185.
15. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Remedies § 1 (1999). "Habeas
corpus" is a general term which referred to several different types of writs under English com-
mon law. As used in modem American law, the term "habeas corpus" refers to the writ of
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The roots of the modern writ of habeas corpus are found in Eng-
lish statutory and common law. 9 It is often referred to as the "Great
Writ," and, historically, it has been recognized as "the greatest of the
safeguards of personal liberty . "20 Recognizing the importance of
the writ and the extraordinary remedy it provides, the framers of the
Constitution provided a federal guarantee for habeas corpus relief:
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it.'"21
Additionally, the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the federal
courts to issue writs of habeas corpus according to the "usages and
principles of law. ,22
Although the federal writ of habeas corpus was originally based
on its common law usage, over the last two hundred years its scope has
been expanded and it has developed a uniquely American flavor. This
novel American development is primarily due to two important fac-
tors: reconstruction and federalism.
Originally, the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus and the
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided habeas corpus relief only to federal
prisoners. This limitation, however, changed when, in 1867, Congress
expanded the applicability of the writ to state prisoners "in all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of
the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." 23 The
reordering of the relationship between states and the federal govern-
ment in the wake of the Civil War "established the federal courts' spe-
cial role in the protection of individual liberty against state
power.. .,,2' Expansion of the writ's applicability was due, in large
part, to the federal government's anticipated difficulty in enforcing
new and, in some cases, unpopular substantive individual rights.25
Additionally, lawmakers recognized that the primary focus in state
courts is the administration of substantive criminal law, specifically
the determination of guilt or innocence. While the state courts are
bound to protect a defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights,
19. Id. See also Emmanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98
DICK. L. REV. 557, 563 (1994).
20. Margolis, supra note 19, at 563; see also Cooper v. Taylor, 70 F.3d 1454 (4th Cir.
1995), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated on other grounds on reh'g en banc, 103 F.3d 366 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 824 (1997).
21. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
22. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
23. See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Concept of Custody and Access to Federal Court,
53 J. URB. L. 61, 62 (1975) (citing WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 53 (2d ed. 1970)).
24. Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N. Y. U. L. REV. 991, 1027 (1985).
25. See Note, supra note 23, at 62.
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"their chief duty is to enforce the law with respect to individuals the
police and prosecutors honestly believe to have violated the law. " 26
Consistent with this assessment of the role of state courts, Pro-
fessor Larry W. Yackle, a leading scholar on habeas corpus, contends
that the overriding responsibility of state courts to enforce state law
"deprives them of the neutrality and dispassion demanded for con-
temporaneous enforcement of the fourteenth amendment." 27  Conse-
quently, the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus provided state
prisoners with the opportunity to relitigate their federal claims in the
federal court system, so long as certain procedural and jurisdictional
requirements were met.
The American system of federalism has also shaped the devel-
opment of the writ. In the American judicial system, state and federal
courts operate in a delicately balanced world of overlapping jurisdic-
tion. With the expansion of the writ in 1867, federal courts were
authorized to collaterally review the actions of state courts. In the
interests of comity, the federal government, particularly the judiciary,
has proceeded carefully, so as to maintain traditional notions of state
sovereignty and to preserve the balance between state and federal
courts.
Although habeas corpus in the United States was originally
fashioned after habeas corpus in England, the expanding protection of
individual substantive rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
and the unique concerns raised by the American federalist system
have combined to transform the writ of habeas corpus over the last
century.
The federal statutes governing the writ of habeas corpus are
contained in sections 2241-2255 of the United States Code. Section
26. Yackle, supra note 24, at 1031.
27. Id. at 1032.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) provides:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,
the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The
order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the
district wherein the restraint complained of is had.
(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the applica-
tion for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to
entertain it.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is
committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or
an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States; or
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2241 gives the federal courts power to grant a writ of habeas corpus,
and section 2254 provides the framework for federal habeas corpus
relief in state cases. According to section 2254, a petitioner seeking a
federal writ of habeas corpus in a state case must meet three threshold
requirements: (1) the petitioner must be in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a state court; (2) the petitioner must allege a violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; and (3) the
petitioner must have raised the constitutional claims and exhausted
the remedies available in the state courts.29 The federal courts' power
to grant writs of habeas corpus under section 2241 has remained
unchanged since 1867, but the courts' interpretation of the require-
ments imposed by section 2254 on a petitioner seeking federal habeas
corpus relief reflect the changing notions of individual substantive
rights and the influence of federalism.
The most significant change, and the most relevant to Mr. Wil-
liamson's petition, has come in the area of the custody requirement.
Neither the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus nor the subse-
quent statutory developments has sought to define the custody
requirement. Consequently, the interpretation of the requirement has
been left to the federal judiciary, which has increasingly liberalized
application of the custody requirement.
Given this trend of increased liberalization, the Ninth Circuit's
holding that Mr. Williamson was not in custody by virtue of the sex
offender registration and notification laws is misguided. In order to
understand the nature of the custody requirement and the argument
for holding that the burdens placed on an individual by virtue of the
sex offender laws qualify as custody for federal habeas corpus pur-
poses, it is important to review the courts' evolving notion of what
constitutes custody.
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act
done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or
exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state,
or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of
nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial
(d) Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody
under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or
more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for
the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district
within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and
each of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the
application. The district court for the district wherein such an application is filed
in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice may transfer the
application to the other district court for hearing and determination.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
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At common law, because custody "began as the very essence of
habeas relief,"3 the courts considered a petitioner to be in custody
only if he was physically confined.31 The writ acted upon the "body,"
and such a writ could not lie in the absence of actual physical confine-
ment. However, as the application of federal habeas corpus evolved in
terms of the prerequisite exhaustion of state remedies, the scope of
reviewable issues, and the tedious federalist jurisdictional balance, fed-
eral courts commensurately liberalized the custody requirement to
reflect these new demands."
The first case to raise the interpretive issue of custody in section
2254 came in 1885 with Wales v. Whitney.33 There, the petitioner, a
naval officer, petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus in order
to challenge his confinement to the city of Washington D.C. pending
the outcome of court-martial proceedings initiated against him by the
Secretary of the Navy.34
In its opinion, the Supreme Court adhered to the common law
notion of custody, because it was unable to envision a serious depriva-
tion of liberty short of physical confinement.35 Consequently, the
court held that "actual confinement, or the present means of enforcing
it, was necessary to constitute custody.) 36 Because Mr. Wales was
only instructed not to leave the city, and was not confined to a cell or
building, the court found that he was not in custody for purposes of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.37
However, the court left room for the later expansion of the cus-
tody requirement when it acknowledged that "the extent and character
of the restraint which justifies the writ, must vary according to the
nature of the control which is asserted over the party in whose behalf
the writ is prayed."3 The court's characterization of restraint seem-
ingly indicated a willingness to make a contextual determination
wherein some sort of restraint short of physical confinement may suf-
fice to render a petitioner in custody for purposes of federal habeas
corpus relief. Despite this potentially expansive language, however,
the court continued to define the custody requirement in terms of
physical confinement for the next eighty-five years.
30. See Note, supra note 23, at 61.
31. Id. at 68.
32. Id.
33. 114 U.S. 564 (1885). See WILLIAM F. DUKE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
HABEAS CORPUS 288 (1980).
34. Wales, 114 U.S. at 565-68.
35. See Note, supra note 23, at 68.
36. Wales, 114 U.S. 564, 572.
37. Id. at 575.
38. Id. at 571.
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Although the custody requirement remained fairly constant for
many years following Wales v. Whitney, the requirement that the peti-
tioner exhaust the remedies available at the state level and the scope of
issues reviewable under the writ underwent significant change.39
Then, in 1963, the Warren Court took the first step in the gradual
expansion of the custody requirement beyond actual physical confine-
ment. o
In Jones v. Cunningham, the Supreme Court held, for the first
time, that a person who was not physically restrained was in custody
for purposes of habeas corpus. In Jones, the petitioner, who was serv-
ing a ten year sentence in a Virginia state penitentiary, filed a petition
for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the EasternDistrict of Virginia.4 ' The District Court dismissed the petition, but
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of
probable cause and leave to appeal in forma pauperis4
Before oral arguments were heard, the petitioner was paroled and
released "into the custody of the Parole Board."43 Once the petitioner
was placed on parole, the Superintendent of the Virginia State Peni-
tentiary, the original respondent listed on the writ, moved to dismiss
the case as moot.4 4 The petitioner opposed the dismissal and, alterna-
tively, sought to add the members of the parole board as respondents.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition against the Super-
intendent and refused to allow the petitioner to add the parole board
members as respondents to the writ."5 Subsequently the Supreme
Court of the Untied States granted certiorari to decide whether a per-
son placed on parole was in custody within the meaning of the federal
habeas corpus statute.46
The court first noted that the federal statute fails to "mark the
boundaries of 'custody"' in that it neither provides a definition of that
term nor limits its use in any other way.47 The court then reviewed"common law usages and the history of habeas corpus both in Eng-
land and in this country, "48 to determine whether habeas corpus could
be used in the context of a defendant who has been paroled.
39. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
40. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
41. Id. at 236-37.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 241.
44. Jones, 371 U.S. at 237.
45. Id. at 238.
46. Jones v. Cunningham, 369 U.S 809 (1962).
47. Jones, 371 U.S. at 238.
48. Id.
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Although the court initially conceded that the primary use of
habeas corpus has been to secure the release of defendants "held in
actual, physical custody in prison or jail,"49 it went on to assert that
"English courts have long recognized the writ as a proper remedy even
though the restraint is something less than close physical confine-
ment."" ° Similarly, the court asserted that in the United States the use
of federal habeas corpus relief has not been restricted to defendants
who are in actual, physical custody. As support for this proposition,
the court noted that habeas corpus is available to aliens seeking entry
into the United States, even though they are not in physical confine-
ment.S1
After clearly establishing that actual, physical confinement was
not the only means by which a petitioner could be in custody pursuant
to section 2254, the court determined that the restraints placed on the
petitioner's liberty by the terms of his parole effectively placed him in
custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief. Among the con-
ditions of his parole that effectively restrained his liberty, the court
noted that the petitioner: (1) was confined to a particular community,
house, and job; (2) could not drive a car without permission; (3) must
periodically report to his parole officer; (4) must permit his parole offi-
cer to visit him at home as well as at his job; and (5) must follow the
parole officer's advice to keep good company, good hours, work regu-
larly and keep away from undesirable places. s2 Furthermore, the court
stated that "a single deviation, however slight, might be enough to
result in his being returned to prison to serve out the very sentence he
claimed was imposed upon him in violation of the United States Con-
stitution." 3
In total, the Court found that the terms of the petitioner's parole"significantly restrain[ed] petitioner's liberty to do those things which
in this country free men are entitled to do" s4 and that "such restraints
are enough to invoke the help of the great writ.) 55
In an apparent attempt to defend its radical expansion of the cus-
tody requirement, the court asserted that the writ could do more than"reach behind prison walls and iron bars."56 The court elaborated that
the writ "is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Jones, 371 U. S. at 239.
52. Id. at 242.
53. Id.
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remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose-the protec-
tion of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrong-
ful restraints upon their liberty. '57 Accordingly, it held that peti-
tioner's parole significantly restrained his freedom and, therefore, he
was in custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief.
The Court's decision in Jones v. Cunningham signified a major
departure from the court's previous interpretation of the custody
requirement. Through its decision, the Court accomplished two
major tasks: (1) it held that physical confinement was not a necessary
requirement for fulfillment of the custody requirement, and (2) it
established the writ as a dynamic process whereby protection against
illegal restraint was the primary concern. After the court's decision in
Jones, it was clear that legal restraint short of physical custody could be
properly characterized as custody, and the issue really became one of
line drawing-how much restraint was enough to satisfy the custody
requirement?
Five years after the Court's decision in Jones v. Cunningham, the
issue of custody was again addressed and again expanded in two cases:
Carafas v. La Valle"8 and Peyton v. Rowe. 9 In Carafas, the Court con-
sidered the effect of postconviction disabilities in the context of the
custody requirement. The petitioner, Mr. Carafas, was released
before his writ was heard, but the court held that despite his release
from confinement, there were certain consequences of his previous
conviction that rendered the petitioner in custody. Among the conse-
quences determined to restrain the petitioner's liberty were the restric-
tions on the types of business the petitioner could engage in, his dis-
qualification from voting, and his inability to serve as a juror.6 ° The
Court held that due to the "disabilities or burdens [which] may flow
from" the petitioner's conviction, he had "a substantial stake in judg-
ment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence
imposed on him."61 Due to these "collateral consequences," the case
did not become moot by virtue of the fact that the petitioner had com-
pleted his sentence of confinement.62
The Court's holding, however, was not based exclusively on the
collateral consequences flowing from the conviction. In order to limit
its holding, the court justified its finding that Mr. Carafas was in cus-
tody by construing the federal statute to require that the petitioner be
57. Id.
58. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
59. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
60. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237.
61. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237-38.
62. Id.
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in custody at the time the petition is filed.63 Because Mr. Carafas filed
his petition while he was still confined to the state penitentiary, the
court held that he was in custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus
relief.64
In Peyton v. Rowe, decided the same year as Carafas, the Court
expanded the custody requirement a little further. It held that where a
petitioner is serving consecutive sentences, he may properly file a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even though he is not yet in con-
finement for the specific conviction he is challenging." According to
the decision, the fact-finding function of the court may be affected if
the petitioner were required to wait until he was serving the second of
two consecutive sentences, because memories would surely have
faded, and important witnesses would be missing or dead.66 Such a
postponement would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the peti-
tioner to satisfy his burden of proof. Further, if the petitioner were
successful, the state would have an equally difficult task if it chose to
retry him.67 In its holding, the Court relied upon Jones for the propo-
sition that the writ was a dynamic remedy that adapted to the exigen-
cies of the time.6" Again, the Court's holding was premised on the
underlying function of federal habeas corpus as a protector of individ-
ual rights.
The next major step in the Court's consistent expansion of the
custody requirement came in 1973 in Hensley v. Municipal Court, San
Jose Milpitas Judicial District.69 There, the Court was required to
determine whether a petitioner who was released on his own recogni-
zance pending execution of his sentence was in custody within the
meaning of section 2254.7 The Hensley Court began with an
acknowledgment, for the first time, that "the functions of the writ
[had] undergone dramatic change."71 The Court asserted that during
this period of dramatic change it had "consistently rejected interpreta-
tions of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in sti-
fling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of
arcane and scholastic procedural requirements. 72
63. Id. at 238.
64. Id.
65. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 64 (1968).
66. Id. at 62.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 66.
69. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 349.
72. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 350.
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Drawing on the content and spirit of previous Supreme Court
decisions regarding the writ of habeas corpus, the Court asserted that
"the demand for speed, flexibility, and simplicity" was a theme
"indelibly marked [upon] construction of the custody requirement" as
well as other requirements of the writ. 73 Accordingly, it held that the
petitioner was in custody for purposes of the habeas corpus statute.
The Court based its holding on a finding that the petitioner was
subject to restraints "not shared by the public generally. ''7 Namely,
the petitioner was required to appear "at all times and places as
ordered by any court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction. "7 Con-
sequently, the petitioner was not free to come and go as he pleased.
"His freedom of movement rest[ed] in the hands of state judicial offi-
cers, who may demand his presence at any time and without a
moment's notice. "76 Furthermore, the Court noted that failure to
comply with the terms of his release was in itself a criminal offense for
which he could be imprisoned.77
In an attempt to limit its holding, the Court made clear that a
state defendant would still be required to exhaust state remedies.
Consequently, a petitioner released on bail or on his own recognizance
pending trial or appeal could not seek federal habeas corpus because
such a petitioner has not exhausted available state remedies.78
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that
"the Court has wandered a long way down the road in expanding tra-
ditional notions of habeas corpus" and that the "present case [was] yet
another step. '"' Justice Blackmun further stated that "the Court
seems now to equate custody with almost any restraint, however,
tenuous. '"80 The Court's decision in Hensley is significant, because it
acknowledged the continued expansion of the custody requirement
and affirmed the Court's reasoning that the writ should be applied
flexibly and expediently to protect unlawful restraints on individual
freedom.
Sixteen years after the decision in Hensley, the Court was again
faced with the interpretation of the custody requirement of section
2254 in Maleng v. Cook.8 There, the Court held that a petitioner does
not remain in custody under a conviction where the sentence imposed
73. Id.
74. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351 (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963)).
75. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1318.4(a), 1318.4(c) (1973)).
76. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 353.
79. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. 490 U.S. 488 (1989).
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has expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction
will be used to enhance sentences imposed for subsequent state
82crimes.
The Court distinguished its holding from Carafas, where it held
that the collateral consequences of the petitioner's sentence-inability
to vote, engage in certain business activities, hold public office, or
serve as a juror-prevented the case from becoming moot when the
petitioner was released from confinement after he filed his petition but
before the petition was heard by the court." The Court noted that the
holding in Carafas, while discussing the collateral consequences in
regard to the determination whether the petitioner was in custody,
rested on the fact that the petitioner was in actual physical custody at
the time the petition was filed. Consequently, "once the sentence
imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral conse-
quences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an
individual 'in custody' for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it."84
Following Maleng, the last case in which the Supreme Court
addressed the interpretation of the custody requirement, the courts
have continued to apply the test announced in Jones v. Cunningham:
whether, as a result of a state court conviction, the petitioner is "sig-
nificantly restrained ... to do those things which in this country free
men are entitled to do."8" The line of Supreme Court opinions since
Jones makes clear that the custody requirement should be liberally
construed in order to protect a petitioner's individual liberty against
unlawful restraint. 86 The issue remains one of line drawing. As the
Court noted in Wales v. Whitney, "the extent and character of the
restraint which justifies the writ, must vary according to the nature of
the control which is asserted over the party in whose behalf the writ is
prayed."87 The writ is a dynamic tool and its procedural requirements
must adapt in accordance with the exigencies of the time in which it is
exercised. In this spirit, the Court has continually expanded the writ
and the custody requirement in order to protect individual liberties.
Due to this continuing expansion and to the absence of a bright
line test designed to determine when a petitioner is in custody for pur-
poses of federal habeas corpus relief, lower courts are forced to engage
in ad hoc determinations guided by the Court's vague references to the
82. Id. at 492.
83. Id. at 491-92.
84. Id. at 492.
85. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
86. See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973).
87. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571 (1885).
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dynamic nature of the writ and the need to apply it flexibly. This has
led some lower courts to further expand the writ's applicability.
For example, in 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the same court that determined Mr. Williamson was not in cus-
tody by operation of Washington State's sex offender laws, held that a
petitioner sentenced to fourteen hours of attendance at an alcohol
rehabilitation program was in custody within the meaning of section
2254.8 The holding was based on the court's determination that the
sentence "significantly restrain[ed] appellant's liberty to do those
things which free persons in the United States are entitled to do. '89
The court reasoned that, like the petitioner in Hensley, the petitioner
in Dow was not free "to come and go as he pleases." 9' The Ninth Cir-
cuit found the sentence to attend alcohol rehabilitation classes so
severe that it went so far as to assert that the petitioner "suffer[ed] a
greater restraint upon his liberty ... than the restraint suffered by a
person who is released upon his own recognizance.
'" 91
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expanded
the custody requirement when it held, in a case of apparent first
impression, that a sentence requiring the petitioner to perform 500
hours of community service effectively placed him in custody for pur-
poses of a federal writ of habeas corpus.92 In its opinion, the Third
Circuit cited the Ninth Circuit's holding in Dow v. Circuit Court of the
First Circuit, and noted that it found "the Dow decision quite compel-
ling and analogous to this matter. , 93
The holdings by the Ninth Circuit in Dow and the Third Circuit
in Barry both rest on the fact that due to the sentences imposed (alco-
hol rehabilitation and community service), the petitioners were
required to be at a certain place at some point in the future. Such a
sentence, according to the courts, placed "restraints on [the peti-
tioner's] liberty not shared by the public generally.94
This language appears to serve as the basis for modern federal
habeas corpus determinations as to whether a petitioner is in custody
within the meaning of section 2254. Nevertheless, the trend is one
toward liberalization of the requirement. Such a trend is at odds with
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Williamson v. Gregoire that the regis-
88. Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993).
89. Id. at 923.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Barry v. Bergen County Probation Department, 128 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 1997).
93. Id. at 160.
94. Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (1993); see also Barry v.
Bergen County Probation Dept., 128 F.3d 152, 161 (both citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.
236 (1963)).
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tration and notification provisions of the Washington sex offender law
failed to place Mr. Williamson in custody pursuant to section 2254.
III. WASHINGTON STATE SEX OFFENDER LAWS
In 1990, Washington's state legislature joined the growing ranks
of state legislatures that responded to the fears of their constituents
regarding the high risk of recidivism among convicted sex offenders.
It passed a statute that now requires "any adult or juvenile residing, or
who is a student, is employed, or carries on a vocation in [the] state
who has been found to have committed or has been convicted of any
sex offense . . or who has been found not guilty by reason of insan-
ity.., of committing any sex offense... 95 to register with the county
sheriff for the county in which the person resides, attends school, or
works.
Each individual who is required to register under the statute
must provide the sheriff with his or her name, address, date and place
of birth, place of employment, crime for which convicted, date and
place of conviction, aliases used, social security number, photograph,
and fingerprints. 96 In turn, the sheriff is required to forward such
information to the Washington State Patrol within five working days,
where a statewide central registry of sex offenders is maintained.97
If a person required to register under section 9A.44.130 changes
his or her residence within the same county, written notice of the
change of address must be sent to the county sheriff within seventy-
two hours of moving.98 If such a person moves to a new county within
the state, that person must send written notice of the change of
address to the county sheriff in the new county fourteen days prior to
moving and must register with that county's sheriff within twenty-
four hours of moving.99 In addition, the registrant must send written
notice within ten days of the move to a new county within the state to
the county sheriff with whom the person last registered."°
If a person required to register moves out of the state of Wash-
ington, that person must send notice within ten days of moving to the
new state to the county sheriff with whom he or she last registered." °
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(1) (1998). The statute also refers to persons convicted
or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a kidnapping offense. For the purposes of this Note,
the discussion will be limited to the statute's treatment of sex offenders.
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(3) (1998)
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.540 (1998).
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Upon receipt of such information, the county sheriff must promptly
forward the information regarding the change of address to the agency
designated by the new state as the state's sex offender registration
agency." 2 Failure to register as required is a class C felony if the crime
for which the person was convicted was a felony. If the crime for
which the person was convicted was not a felony, failure to register is a
gross misdemeanor.0 3
Each year, the county sheriff must verify the addresses of regis-
tered sex offenders by sending, via certified mail with return receipt
requested, a nonforwardable verification form to the last registered
address of each offender.0 4 Each registrant must then sign the verifi-
cation form and return it to the county sheriff within ten days of
receipt.1"' If a registrant does not sign and return the verification
form, the county sheriff must make reasonable attempts to locate him
or her.0 6 If the registrant fails to return the verification form or is not
at the last registered address, the county sheriff must forward such
information to the Washington State Patrol for inclusion in the state's
central registry.'0 7
The duty to register continues for a period ranging from ten
years to life, depending on the seriousness of the registrant's crime and
on the number of prior convictions for which the registrant was con-
victed. If the registrant was convicted of a class C felony and does not
have one or more prior convictions for a sex offense, the duty to regis-
ter lasts for ten years from release or entry of judgment and sen-
tence.1" If the registrant is convicted of a class B felony and does not
have one or more prior convictions for a sex offense, the duty to regis-
ter lasts for fifteen years. However, when a registrant is convicted of a
class A felony or has one or more prior convictions for sex offenses,
the duty to register continues indefinitely unless the registrant peti-
tions the Superior Court to be relieved of that duty. A registrant can
bring such a petition only after spending ten consecutive years in the
community without being convicted on any new offenses.0 9
In determining whether a registrant should be prematurely
relieved of the duty to register, the court considers the nature of the
offense which resulted in the registrant's duty to register, the criminal
102. Id.
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(9) (1998).
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.135(1) (1998).
105. Id.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.135(2) (1998).
107. Id.
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140(1) (1998).
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140 (1)-(3) (1998).
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and relevant noncriminal behavior of the registrant before and after
the conviction, and any other factors it deems relevant.1 ' The court
may only relieve a registrant of his or her duty to register if the regis-
trant can demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that future
registration will not serve the purposes of the sex offender registration
statutes.11
In addition to the registration requirements discussed above,
Washington's state legislature also enacted a statute authorizing the
release of information obtained through registration to the public."'
The extent of the public disclosure varies depending on the level of
risk posed by the offender to the community and the "needs of the
affected community members for information to enhance their indi-
vidual and collective safety.""' For purposes of determining the
extent of public disclosure, the county sheriff assigns a risk level to
each registered offender in the county."' A level one offender poses
the lowest risk to the community, and where a level one assessment is
made, the county sheriff is authorized to share all "relevant, necessary
and accurate" registration information with other "appropriate law
enforcement agencies" and any victim, witness to the offense, or indi-
vidual who lives near the registrant upon request." 5
A level two offender poses a moderate risk to the community. In
addition to the information which may be released for a level one
offender, a county sheriff may release "relevant, necessary, and accu-
rate" information to "public and private schools, child day care cen-
ters, family day care providers, businesses and organizations that serve
primarily children, women, or vulnerable adults, and neighbors and
community groups" near the place where the registrant resides, plans
to reside, or is regularly found." 6
Finally, when a registrant is categorized as a level three offender,
the classification is based on an assessment that the registrant poses a
high risk of reoffense within the community."7 Upon such a determi-
nation, the county sheriff is authorized to release, in addition to the
information authorized to be released regarding level one and two
offenders, "relevant, necessary, and accurate" information to the pub-
lic at large." 8
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140(3) (1998).
Ill. Id.
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550 (1998).
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550(2) (1998).
114. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550(3) (1998).
115. Id.
116. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.4.24.550(3) (1998).
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.145(3) (1998).
118. Id.
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The legislature believed that a statute requiring convicted sex
offenders to register with local law enforcement was necessary based
on its finding that
sex offenders often pose a high risk of reoffense, and that law
enforcement's efforts to protect their communities, conduct
investigations, and quickly apprehend offenders who commit sex
offenses, are impaired by the lack of information available to law
enforcement agencies about convicted sex offenders who live
within the law enforcement agency's jurisdiction." 9
The legislature believed that "sex offender registration has
assisted law enforcement agencies in protecting their community.' 12°
However, these seemingly well-guided efforts to protect the commu-
nity have often led to volatile confrontations and increased acts of
vigilantism.
While it is clear that the statutory scheme of registration and
notification places serious burdens on both local law enforcement
authorities and registrants, an honest analysis about sex offender reg-
istration and notification must include a discussion of the operative
effect of such a statute. In many instances, the notification provisions
exacerbate the problems the legislature intended to remedy.
Perhaps the most notorious example of community notification
leading to vigilantism in Washington is that of Peter Gallardo. On
July 12, 1993, thirty-five year old Gallardo was released from Twin
Rivers Corrections Center in Monroe, where he served eighteen
months for first degree statutory rape. 121 One week before his release,
the Snohomish County Sheriff's office distributed fliers in the Alder-
wood Manor area of Lynnwood, Washington. Gallardo's parents
lived in the neighborhood, and he planned on returning to live with
them upon his release. The fliers distributed by the Sheriffs office,
which resembled a 'wanted' poster, included a photograph of Gallardo
and warned that he had a very high probability of reoffending. 122 The
flier said that Gallardo had "sadistic and deviant sexual fantasies
which include torture, sexual assault, human sacrifice, bondage, and
the murder of small children." '123
119. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 402 (included in notes following WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.44.130 (1998)).
120. 1991 Wash. Laws ch. 274 (included in notes following WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.44.130 (1998)).
121. Fire at Sex Offender's Home Brings Cheers, New Fears, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE,
July 13, 1993, at Al.
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In response to the notification of Gallardo's plans to move into
the neighborhood, a community safety rally was organized and about
three hundred community members attended. Hours after the rally,
the home that Gallardo intended to move into was burned to the
ground. The cause of the fire was arson.
One year before Gallardo's home was burned, Jonathan Tampico
attempted to resettle in Tacoma after serving a prison term in Califor-
nia for child molestation. However, after residents in the neighbor-
hood were informed of Tampico's intention to move into the
community, neighbors began protesting his presence. The resultant
uproar drove Tampico to return to California." 4
Similarly, in Issaquah, Washington, local residents picketed a
Texaco station during rush hour traffic and tried to dissuade drivers
from patronizing the station after they were notified that Victor New-
man, a convicted sex offender, was working there.12 Newman had
been recently released after serving ten years in prison after being con-
victed of indecent liberties and robbery when, during the course of a
burglary, he fondled a woman as she slept.126 Newman clearly stated
on his application that he was a convicted sex offender, but the owner
of the gas station, who described Newman as an honest, loyal and
dedicated employee, hired him anyway. Residents of Issaquah
became aware of Newman's past when the school district sent a notice
home with all students.2 7
The potential for violent community response has only increased
in recent months with the advent of web sites dedicated to the dis-
semination of sex offender registration information. In King County,
the sheriffs office includes names, descriptions, addresses, and con-
viction information.2 In other counties around Washington, similar
web sites include the registrant's photograph.'29
Such broad public notification and the resultant community
reaction have become part of the sex offender registration regime, and
must be considered in assessing the restraints placed on registrants'
individual liberty in the context of the custody requirement for a fed-
eral writ of habeas corpus.
124. Fire at Sex Offender's Home Brings Cheers, supra note 121, at Al.
125. Katherine Long, Gas Station Picketed Over Ex-Con's Hiring; Boss Stands by Choice,
SEATTLE TIMEs, February 2, 1995, at B5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See <http://www.metrokc.gov/sheriff/sosch.htm> (last modified Sept. 22, 1999).
129. See, e.g., <http://www.co.clark.wa.us/sheriff/inter/sex%20offender/sex.htm> (last
modified Oct. 11, 1999); <http://www.cowlitzcounty.org/sheriff/rso> (last modified Dec. 7,
1999).
1999]
Seattle University Law Review
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR CUSTODY
In Williamson v. Gregoire, the issue presented to the court was
whether "a convicted child molester who has completed his sentence,
but who is required to register as a sex offender under state law, is 'in
custody' for purposes of federal habeas corpus.""13  In determining
that the petitioner, Mr. Williamson, was not in custody by virtue of
the sex offender laws, the Ninth Circuit wrongly based its holding on
a finding that the registration and notification requirements were col-
lateral consequences of the crime, rather than restraints on the peti-
tioner's liberty. The decision is contrary to the trend of expansion and
liberalization of the custody requirement by the Supreme Court.
Rather than applying the requirement flexibly, the Ninth Circuit
approached the issue in a formalistic fashion; a fashion that has been
abandoned by the Supreme Court since Jones v. Cunningham.
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Gregoire cites Maleng v. Cook for
the proposition that "once the sentence imposed for a conviction has
completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are
not themselves sufficient to render an individual 'in custody' for the
purposes of habeas attack upon it."'' Based on this holding, the
Ninth Circuit asserted that "the boundary that limits the 'in custody'
requirement is the line between a 'restraint on liberty' and a 'collateral
consequence' of a conviction." '132 That assertion is an oversimplifica-
tion of the court's holding in Maleng.
The Maleng Court held that collateral consequences alone were
not enough to place a person in custody.'33 It did not hold that collat-
eral consequences and restraints on liberty are mutually exclusive.
The test for determining when a petitioner is in custody is the same
after Maleng as it was before Maleng. Simply put, if a petitioner's lib-
erty is restrained in a way that the general public's is not, then the
petitioner is in custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus.
Collateral consequences have traditionally included such restric-
tions as the inability to vote, hold public office, or serve as a juror.
Similarly, imposition of fines or revocation of licenses are often char-
acterized as collateral consequences.
In Maleng, the collateral consequence of the petitioner's crime
was the possibility that a previous conviction may increase the
sentence for a subsequent conviction. The question faced by the
130. Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
824 (1999).
131. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183 (citing Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989)).
132. Williamson, 151 F.3dat 1183.
133. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492.
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Court in Maleng was "whether a habeas petitioner remains 'in cus-
tody' under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully
expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction will
be used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes
of which he is convicted." '134 While the Court acknowledged the
tradition of liberal construction that it had afforded the custody
requirement, it went on to state that it had "never extended it to the
situation where a habeas petitioner suffers no present restraint from a
conviction.""13 Thus, even though the Court discussed the possibility
of future sentence enhancement as a collateral consequence of the
petitioner's crime, it did not base its holding on that distinction. The
foundation of the analysis is restraint, and, thus, the court should
rather determine whether the petitioner's liberty is restrained in a way
that the general public's is not.
Furthermore, the Court in Maleng went on to hold that the peti-
tioner was in custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus. 36 The
petitioner in Maleng was, in fact, convicted on a subsequent charge
and was serving a federal sentence at the time the Court heard his
case. Drawing on its holding in Peyton v. Rowe that a petitioner who
was serving two consecutive sentences could challenge the second
sentence which he had not yet begun to serve, the Court again took a
very liberal approach to the custody requirement and construed the
petition in such a way that it was possible to argue that the petitioner
was in custody for the state conviction. 37 The Court's willingness to
extend the custody requirement to the petitioner in Maleng may be the
most liberal expansion by the Court thus far. It is ironic that the
Ninth Circuit would use the Maleng case to justify such a narrow and
formalistic approach to the custody requirement.
The sex offender registration and notification requirements may
be characterized as collateral consequences, but that determination
does not properly end the analysis. The court still must consider whe-
ther the requirements and restrictions placed on the petitioner,
whether characterized as collateral consequences or not, operate to
restrict the petitioner's liberty.
The Ninth Circuit held that the registration and notification pro-
visions did not significantly restrain Mr. Williamson's physical
liberty, because it believed that the provisions did not impede his
physical movement or demand his physical presence at any particular
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 493.
137. Id.
1999]
Seattle University Law Review
time or place. This reading of the provisions in the context of custody
is extremely narrow and contrary to the liberal interpretive tradition
afforded such cases by the Supreme Court.
On its face, the statute requiring Mr. Williamson to register
restrains his liberty. He is required to register annually, register
before he moves, and register after he moves. He must provide the
local sheriff with a broad range of personal information that will be
used to track his movement. These are not restraints shared by the
public generally.
Even his physical movement is restrained by the provisions. For
example, Mr. Williamson cannot move without knowing his destina-
tion at least fourteen days in advance. He must always have an
address where the sheriff can reach him. Such a restraint is not shared
by the public generally.
The court acknowledged that the registration and notification
provisions "might create some kind of subjective chill on Williamson's
desire to travel," but, because the chill was purely subjective, the court
held that the disincentive to move did not amount to custody. 138
While it is true that Williamson can move as long as he complies with
the registration requirements, the experiences of Peter Gallardo and
Victor Newman illustrate that the "chill" on the petitioner's desire to
travel is not subjective. Peter Gallardo could not live in a house that
was burned down. Because of the notification provisions and the
hysteria they caused in the community, Mr. Gallardo could not move
to Lynnwood.
Stories like Mr. Gallardo's are not rare. Registered sex offenders
face ostracism and stigmatization whenever and wherever they move,
and, as a result of the requirements, registered sex offenders are often
unable to move. Such restraint is not based purely on a "subjective
chill."
Like a petitioner who is on parole and in custody for purposes of
federal habeas corpus relief, a registered sex offender cannot move
freely and is subject to rearrest. The primary difference between the
restraints imposed on parolees and registered sex offenders is that
parole ends, whereas the sex offender registration requirement can
continue for life. In many ways, mandatory registration and notifica-
tion resembles a lifetime parole.
From a policy perspective, the sex offender registration and noti-
fication requirements demand the protection of the "Great Writ."
Serious and enduring branding results from these statutes. It is truly
138. Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
824 (1999).
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the scarlet letter of modern criminal law. Given the serious conse-
quences associated with sex offender registration statutes, it is difficult
to imagine a situation where the need to protect a petitioner's individ-
ual constitutional liberties is more critical.
The Supreme Court has denied Mr. Williamson's writ of certio-
rari in this case.139 Due to the novel questions raised when applying
the custody requirement of the writ of habeas corpus in the context of
sex offender registration and notification statutes, it is only a matter of
time until another circuit confronts the same situation and, applying
the writ liberally as required by the Supreme Court's holdings, deter-
mines that the petitioner is in custody. Once a split occurs among the
circuits, the Supreme Court should review the issue to clarify whether
or not a convicted sex offender is in custody by virtue of the sex
offender registration and notification statutes that are springing up
throughout the country. If the Court continues to follow the liberal
trend that has developed in the last sixty years, it should hold that
such a petitioner is indeed in custody for purposes of federal habeas
corpus.
139. Williamson v. Gregoire, 119 S. Ct. 824 (1999).
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